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EASEMENT LAW AND SERVICE OF NON-
DOMINANT TENEMENTS: TIME FOR A CHANGE
Robert Kratovil*
I. INTRODUCTION
Easement law has long followed a rigid rule prohibiting use of
an appurtenant easement to service non-dominant land. At times,
this rule has led to litigation seeking to block use of an access ease-
ment where a valuable building has been placed on non-dominant
land.' Such litigation has been unsuccessful in some instances in
which the increased burden on the easement has been slight. Yet, if
the owner of a servient tenement wishes to pursue a matter of this
sort, an easement owner may be subjected to a type of "legal extor-
tion"' if he has, in ignorance of this technical rule, expanded his
operations beyond the boundaries of the dominant tenement. The en-
suing litigation is usually needless, expensive and time consuming.
The time has come to adopt a new standard for judging the
increase of burden upon an easement. Such a standard should allow
for flexibility without forcing unnecessary litigation and Without un-
fairly burdening the owner of the servient tenement. This article
proposes that the situation described be brought within the scope of
the familiar "unreasonable increase of burden" rule governing other
aspects of easement law. Additionally, consideration of the existing
rule when creating an easement could eliminate subsequent problems
arising from an increase of burden. Creation of better standards for
allowing increase of burden and for determining the rights of servi-
ent and dominant owners is needed.
II. BURDENING NON-DOMINANT TENEMENTS
Where an appurtenant easement exists, the rights of the owners
© 1984 by Robert Kratovil.
* J.D. De Paul University; Professor, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago,
Illinois.
1. See infra, notes 3-25 and accompanying text.
2. See infra, notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
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of two (or more) tracts of land, often adjoining tracts,3 must be rec-
onciled. For example, A owns Blackacre and B owns adjoining
Whiteacre. A grants B an easement of ingress and egress over a por-
tion of Blackacre so that B can enjoy more convenient access to
Whiteacre. Because A continues to own the underlying fee and the
easement does not give B the exclusive right to use the easement
tract,' both A and B will use the easement premises. Therefore, op-
portunities for conflict exist.
In the above illustration, Whiteacre is the dominant tenement
or dominant estate. Quite obviously, as time wears on, changes may
take place in the dominant tenement. Consider the following scena-
rios for the future of Whiteacre:
1) When the easement was created, Whiteacre was grazing
land. It is now converted to farm land with trucks and farm machin-
ery traveling across the easement;
2) Whiteacre was improved with a residence when the easement
was first created. Now the residence has been demolished and re-
placed with a hotel;
3) When the easement was first created, Whiteacre was a truck
farm. Now it has been subdivided and twenty homes have been er-
ected and sold to homebuyers;
4) When the easement was first created, Whiteacre was a forty-
acre farm. The owner has since acquired another forty acres adjoin-
ing Whiteacre and uses the easement for the entire eighty acres.
It is obvious that in all these scenarios the problem is one of
achieving an accommodation that is fair to both parties. Yet, it is
only in the last example that any litigation between the parties will
be decided without considering the question of fair accommodation.
It is a well-established rule that an appurtenant easement must
be used to service only the dominant tenement. It must not be used to
service non-dominant land. In Penn Bowling Recreation Center Inc.
v. Hot Shoppes Inc.,' a tract of land owned by Hot Shoppes was
subject to an easement of ingress and egress for the benefit of Black-
acre. The owner of Blackacre subsequently acquired additional adja-
cent land and constructed a building that occupied parts of the domi-
nant tenement and the acquired property. The Circuit Court of
Appeals held that use of the easement to service this building could
not be permitted, stating: "[T]he owner of the dominant tenement
3. There is no requirement of contiguity. Allendorf v. Daly, 6 Ill. 2d 577, 129 N.E.2d
673 (1955).
4. Easements are not exclusive. Etz v. Mamerow, 72 Ariz. 228, 233 P.2d 442 (1951).
5. 179 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1949), Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 602 (1951).
[Vol. 24
EASEMENT LAW
may not subject the servient tenement to use or servitude in connec-
tion with other premises to which the easement is not appurtenant." 6
To sustain the rule that the servient tenement may not be used
to serve non-dominant land, the ancient authorities point to the pos-
sibility that, were the rule otherwise, the easement could be unrea-
sonably burdened. Thus in Shroder v. Brenneman' the court stated:
It is a well-settled rule of law, that if a man has a right of
way over another's land to a particular close, he cannot enlarge
it and extend it to other closes, and this whether his right be by
user or by deed: Rolle 391, Howell v. King; I Mod. 190, Hen-
ning v. Burnett; 8 Exch. Rep. 192, Davenport v. Lawson; 21
Pick. 72, Kirkham v. Sharp; I Wh. 323, Lewis v. Carstairs; 6
Wh. 207.
The reason of the rule is stated in Howell v. King, and
runs through the subsequent cases, that if the law were not so
the owner of the close to which the right is appurtenant might
purchase an indefinite number of adjoining acres, and annex the
right to them, by which the grantor of the way might be entirely
deprived of the benefit of his land; a reason which applies with
all its force to a private alley like that in respect to which this
suit was brought.8
Another reason given for the rule is that permitting use of the
easement to service the additional land would have the effect of mak-
ing an easement in gross out of an easement appurtenant. 9 This is
mechanical jurisprudence and contributes little to a solution of the
problem. Still another specious reason used to support the rule
prohibiting service to non-dominant land is that "no one but the
6. Penn Bowling Recreation Center Inc. v. Hot Shoppes Inc., 179 F.2d 64, 66; (D.C.
Cir. 1949). To like effect are Cooper v. Sawyer, 405 P.2d 394 (Hawaii 1965); Goodwillie Co.
v. Commonwealth Electric Co., 241 I11. 42, 89 N.E. 272 (1909); Kixmiller v. Baltimore &
O.S.W.R. Co., 60 Ind. App. 686, 111 N.E. 401 (1916); Thul v. Weiland, 213 Iowa 713, 239
N.W. 515 (1931); Cooley v. Boston & Maine R.R., 303 Mass. 371, 21 N.E.2d 953 (1939);
Knotts v. Summit Park Co., 146 Md. 234, 126 A. 280 (1924); French v. Marstin, 24 N.H.
440 (1851); Diocese of Trenton v. Toman, 74 N.J. Eq. 702, 70 A.D. 606 (1908); McCullough
v. Broad Exchange Co., 101 A. D. 566, 92 N.Y.S. 533 (1905); College Inns of America Inc. v.
Cully, 254 Or. 375, 460 P.2d 360 (1969); Reise v. Enos, 76 Wis. 634, 45 N.W. 414 (1890);
Williams v. James, 2 L.R.-C.P. 577 (1867); 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements & Licenses § 77
(1966); Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 461 (1956); Annot., 122 A.L.R. 1166 (1939).
7. 23 Pa. 348 (1854). See also French v. Marstin, 24 N.H. 440, 443 (1851). In short,
the purpose of the rule is to prevent an increase of burden on the servient tenement. Wood v.
Woodley, 160 N.C. 4, 75 S.E. 719, 720 (1912); Adams v. Winett, 25 Tenn. App. 276, 156
S.W.2d 353, 357 (1941).
8. 23 Pa. 348, 350-51.
9. E. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 384 (1974).
1984]
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owner of land can create an easement over it.' 0o The reasons given
must be tested against other generally accepted principles of ease-
ment law to determine if they can withstand scrutiny.
A. Increase of Burden-The Reasonableness Test
Because an easement is not exclusive," both the dominant and
the servient owners will make use of the easement premises. When
two strangers must share the use of the same premises, disputes and
differences of opinion are bound to arise. If the point at issue is not
covered by the specific language of the easement grant, the law ad-
monishes both parties to be "reasonable in the exercise of their re-
spective privileges."' 2 The authorities allowing the dominant owner
any unlimited reasonable use are numerous."' Likewise, the servient
owner may use his land in any reasonable manner that does not
unduly burden the use made by the easement owner." And if several
different parties have easement rights over the same premises, each
must use the premises in a way that is reasonable as regards the
others." As a result, a court must balance the equities and take into
consideration the advantage of one owner's use and the disadvantage
to the other owner caused by that use."
This, of course, concedes that there may be an increase in the
volume and a change in the kind of use in the course of enjoyment of
the easement." In other words, a progression from ox teams to trac-
tors is normal 8 and a change as drastic as one from farm-crossing to
serving a new hospital has been approved." Also, an easement for
access to a private dwelling could later be used as a means of access
to a hotel erected on the dominant tenement.2 ° The parties, it is as-
sumed, contemplated the normal development of the dominant
10. Heritage Standard Bank v. Trustees of Schools, 84 Ill. App. 3d 653, 405 N.E. 2d
1196, 1199 (1980).
11. See supra note 2.
12. RESTATEMENT PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 486 (1944).
13. Peterson v. Oxford, 189 Conn. 740, 459 A.2d 100, 102 (1983); Long v. Sendelbach,
56 Or. App. 158, 641 P.2d 1136 (1981); Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 1256, (1965).
14. Lindhorst v. Wright, 616 P.2d 450 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980).
15. Cox v. Glenbrook Co., 78 Nev. 254, 371 P.2d 647, 653 (1962).
16. Farmer v. Kentucky Utilities Co., 642 S.W.2d 579 (1982); Delaney v. Gurrieri, 122
N.H. 819, 451 A.2d 394 (1982).
17. Long v. Sendelbach, 56 Or. App. 158, 641 P.2d 1136 (1981) (citing 25 AM. JUR.
2D Easements and Licenses § 74 (1966)).
18. Glenn v. Poole, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 292, 423 N.E. 2d 1030 (1981).
19. Inter Community Memorial Hospital Building Fund, Inc. v. Brown, 9 Misc. 2d
202, 168 N.Y.S.2d 535 (1957).
20. White v. Grand Hotel [1912] 1 Ch. 113.
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tenement. 2 1
Commonly, the permitted increase in use of the dominant tene-
ment is referred to in terms of "increase of burden." The use of the
dominant tenement may not be so substantially enlarged or materi-
ally changed that an increased burden on the servient estate results.22
However, a reading of the decisions reveals that the phrase "increase
of burden" has no precise significance. 28 Basically, the test is one of
reasonableness.
When the dominant land is divided into parts, whether by deed
or will, each part enjoys the benefit of the easement provided the
burden on the servient estate is not thereby increased.' Again, the
courts do not hesitate to address the task of determining whether an
unreasonable increase of burden has occurred. The decisions, how-
ever, do not always agree as to what constitutes an unreasonable in-
crease of burden.
In Bang v. Foreman,25 plaintiffs purchased certain lots grant-
ing an easement right to use a nearby beach, which was to be for the
exclusive use of the lot owners. The defendants purchased three lots
and subdivided them into twenty-six smaller lots. At the same time,
they constructed a paved roadway through the lots to the beach and
sold the subdivided lots with "beach privileges to all owners." On
appeal, the court granted a decree enjoining use of the beach in this
manner." In Henkle v. Goldenson,7 defendant, who owned a lot
that enjoyed the benefit of an easement for access to a lake, conveyed
the north half of his lot to five individuals. The servient owner chal-
lenged the right of the five grantees to use the easement, alleging
increase of burden. The court, however, upheld, their right to use
the way.2 8 While the increase in burden did not differ substantially
in the two cases, the holdings are diametrically opposed.
Perhaps the most dramatic expression of the rule that gives un-
usually harsh treatment to the use of an easement to service non-
21. RESTATEMENT PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 484 (1944).
22. Smith v. Rock Creek Water Corp., 9 Cal. App. 2d 49, 208 P.2d 705 (1949); Reid v.
Washington Gas Light Co., 232 Md. 545, 194 A.2d 636 (1963); Shammel v. Vogl, 144 Mont.
354, 396 P.2d 103 (1964); Conrad v. Strickler, 215 Va. 454, 211 S.E.2d 248 (1975).
23. Kratovil, Easement Draftsmanship and Conveyancing, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 426, 443
(1950).
24. Wood v. Woodley, 160 N.C. 4, 75 S.E. 719, 720 (1912) (citing E. WASHBURN, A
TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES (1873)); Annot., 10
A.L.R.3d 960, (1966).
25. 244 Mich. 571, 222 N.W. 96 (1928).
26. Id.
27. Henkle v. Goldenson, 263 Mich. 140, 248 N.W. 574 (1933).
28. Id.
1984]
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dominant land occurred in Crimmins v. Gould.29 There the court
stated:
However, here the question is not the propriety of an in-
junction but rather the propriety of an extinguishment. There
do not seem to be any California cases on extinguishment for
excessive use by non-dominant property where the right given
to the dominant estate was by grant. But there are a number of
out-of state cases. The general rule is that misuse or excessive
use is not sufficient for abandonment or forfeiture, but an in-
junction is the proper remedy. But where the burden of the ser-
vient estate is increased through changes in the dominant estate
which increase the use and subject it to use of non-dominant
property, a forfeiture will be justified if the unauthorized use
may not be severed and prohibited. 0
In McCullough v. Broad Exchange Co.,8 1 the easement in
question was one of ingress and egress. The dominant owner erected
an office building twenty stories high partly upon the dominant land
and partly on adjacent non-dominant land. Nothing in the decision
suggests that the servient owner at any time uttered a word of pro-
test while the construction was going forward. After construction
was completed, however, the servient owner filed an action seeking
to have the easement declared forfeited. The reviewing court reversed
the lower court's forfeiture of the easement, but enjoined the build-
ing owner from using the easement until the structure could be al-
tered to cut off access to the easement from the non-dominant por-
tion of the building."2
The case is clearly wrong because whatever the rights of the
plaintiff might have been had he acted promptly, they were certainly
lost by laches. When a party having a right to block improvements
stands idly by while material expenses are incurred in constructing
such improvements, laches acts to deny the right to interfere with the
improvements. 8 Presumably this court would have made the identi-
cal holding had the defendant constructed the Empire State Building
straddling the dominant and the non-dominant land. 4
29. 149 Cal. App. 2d 383, 308 P.2d 786, (1957).
30. Id. at 391. See also Penn Bowling Recreation Center v. Hot Shoppes, 179 F.2d 64
(D.C. Cir. 1949).
31. 101 App. Div. 566, 92 N.Y.S. 533 (1905).
32. A dissenting judge thought the easement should be declared forfeited. Id. at 574.
33. Brandenburg v. Country Club Bldg. Corp., 332 I1. 136, 148, 163 N.E. 440 (1928);
Smith v. Spencer, 81 N.J. Eq. 389, 87 A. 158 (1913); 30A C.J.S. Equity § 113, (1965); 43A
C.J.S. Injunctions § 103 (1978).
34. See also Knotts v. Summit Park Co., 146 Md. 234, 126 A. 280 (1924).
[Vol. 24
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B. Implied Easements
Some illumination into the process by which courts often solve
easement problems can be gleaned by looking at implied easements.
This area of easement law probably generates more litigation than
any other area. For example, assume A owned two adjoining parcels
of land, each improved with a two-story building and joined by a
party wall. There were stores on the first floor and living quarters
on the second floor. A stairway to the second floor was located en-
tirely on Parcel A, but at the head of the stairs there was a landing
and a door opening through the party wall which afforded access to
Parcel B. The owner conveyed Parcel A to B but made no mention
of the stairway. When B threatened to close up the opening in the
wall, A filed suit to enjoin. The court ruled for A, holding an im-
plied easement had been created."' The philosophy underlying this
rule is expressed in the Restatement of Property.3"
Thus even where the parties gave no thought whatever to the
35. Powers v. Heffernan, 233 Ill. 597, 84 N.E. 661 (1908). Modern decisions do not
distinguish between implied reservation and implied grant. 3 R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY §
411 at 34-90 (Rohan ed. 1981); see also 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses § 27 at 440
(1966); Annot., 34 A.L.R. 233, (1925 Supp. 100 A.L.R. 1321, 1936 & Supp. 164 A.L.R. 1001
1946); Annot., 94 A.L.R. 3d 502.
36. The Restatement of Property states:
In determining whether the circumstances under which a conveyance of land is
made imply an easement, the following factors are important
(a) whether the claimant is the conveyor or the conveye,
(b) the terms of the conveyance,
(c) the consideration given for it,
(d) whether the claim is made against a simultaneous conveyee,
(e) the extent of necessity of the easement to the claimant,
(f) whether reciprocal benefits result to the conveyor and the conveyee,
(g) the manner in which the land was used prior to its conveyance, and
(h) the extent to which the manner of prior use was or might have been
known to the parties.
Comment:
a. Rationale. An easement created by implication arises as an inference of
the intention of the parties to a conveyance of land. The inference is drawn from
the circumstances under which the conveyance was made rather than from the
language of the conveyance. To draw an inference of intention from such cir-
cumstances, they must be or must be assumed to be within the knowledge of the
parties. The inference drawn represents an attempt to ascribe an intention to
parties who had not thought or had not bothered to put the intention into
words, or perhaps more often, to parties who actually had formed no intention
conscious to themselves. In the latter aspect, the implication approaches in fact,
if not in theory, crediting the parties with an intention which they did not have,
but which they probably would have had had they actually foreseen what they
might have foreseen from information available at the time of the conveyance.
RESTATEMENT PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 476 and Comment a; 3 R. POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY § 411 at 34-82. (Rohan ed. 1981).
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creation of an easement, the court infers sufficient facts from the cir-
cumstances to create an easement. Manifestly, the references to "in-
tention" are no more than resort to an obvious legal fiction.
There is an unspoken philosophy that can be deduced by care-
ful study of the factual situations presented. Where the easement is
so apparent and so necessary that the parties must have intended to
continue its use beyond the severance of ownership, there is only one
explanation for the litigation that later occurs. The servient owner,
perceiving that the documents make no mention of the easement, de-
cides to extract a few extra dollars from his neighbor. The courts
read the situation correctly and refuse to permit extortion.
It is evident that one cannot hope to understand easement law
unless, in analyzing the facts of each case, one looks for the extortion
situation and asks whether the courts will permit it.
The equitable principle requiring that attempts at extortion
must be blocked by the courts is one of broad application. For exam-
ple, where a plaintiff seeks a mandatory injunction to compel re-
moval of an encroachment by his neighbor and the encroachment is
slight, the court will refuse to grant the injunction, for to grant the
injunction "might make the court a party to extortion. ' 7 Indeed,
where a court of equity, in balancing the equities, refuses to grant
the relief prayed for, one can often discern an attempt at extortion.
Where the benefit to the plaintiff would be relatively small, and the
harm to the defendant relatively great, it is a reasonable inference
that in many such cases the plaintiff is seeking to exact tribute from
the defendant. Equity will not lend its aid to an oppressive penaliz-
ing of the defendant. 8
III. BALANCING-TRIVIAL EXTENSIONS TO NON-DOMINANT
LAND
Where use of the easement is extended to non-dominant land,
but the extension is trivial, no injunction will be granted.89 The doc-
trine of balancing the equities is therefore obviously applicable to the
non-dominant land rule, and this brings into question whether the
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941, Comment c; 43 C.J.S. Injunctions §
35, at 841; 43A C.J.S. Injunctions, § 81 at 93 (1978).
38. McKean, The Balance of Convenience Doctrine, 39 DICK. L. REV. 211, 216
(1934); Annot., 40 A.L.R. 3d 606, 611, 615.
39. Wetmore v. Ladies of Loretto Wheaton, 73 III. App. 2d 454, 220 N.E. 2d 491, 497
(1966); Beeman v. Pawelek, 96 N.Y.S. 2d 204, 214 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Chapin v. Gay Coal &
Coke Co., 156 S.E. 49 (W. Va. 1930); 28 C.J.S. Easements § 92 at 773; 25 AM. JUR. 2D
Easements § 107 at 511.
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strict majority rule forbidding any extension can be justified.
As previously indicated, the rule is simply one member of a
family of rules dealing with increase of burden.4 0 Thus in Adams v.
Winnett, it was said:
A fundamental principle is that an easement for the benefit
of a particular piece of land cannot be enlarged and extended to
other parcels of land, whether adjoining or distinct tracts, to
which the right is not attached. In other words, an easement
appurtenant to a dominant tenement can be used only for the
purposes of that tenement; it is not a personal right, and cannot
be used, even by the dominant owner, for any purpose uncon-
nected with the enjoyment of his estate. The purpose of this rule
is to prevent an increase of the burden upon the servient estate,
and it applies whether the easement is created by grant, reserva-
tion, prescription, or implication . . . .'4 (emphasis added)
And in another decision, quoting from Jones on Easements, sec-
tion 360 the court said:
One having a right of way appurtenant to certain land can-
not use it for the benefit of other land to which the right is not
attached, although such other land is within the same enclosure
with that to which the easement belongs. Except for this rule,
the burden upon the servient estate might be increased at the
pleasure of the owner of the dominant estate. This rule is there-
fore applicable, whether the way was created by grant, reserva-
tion, prescription, or as a way of necessity. In either case the
way is created by grant, either express, presumed or applied.
The way is granted for the benefit of the particular land, and its
use is limited to such land. Its use cannot be extended to other
land, nor can the way be converted into a public way without
the consent of the owner of the servient estate.42(emphasis
added)
Since the rule falls within the ambit of the increase of burden
rule, it should be treated like other rules in this area. The court
determines, on a case-by-case basis, whether the increase in burden
is reasonable or unreasonable. And whether the dominant structure
expands vertically or horizontally is of little economic consequence to
the servient owner.
Those who would oppose such an expansion of the increase-of-
burden rule will undoubtedly ask where the court derives power to
40. See supra note 4.
41. 25 Tenn. App. 276, 156 S.W. 353, 357 (1941).
42. Wood v. Woodley, 160 N.C. 17, 75 S.E. 719, 720 (1912).
19841
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
extend the benefit of the easement to non-dominant land. The an-
swer is that in most cases this will lead to a practical and just solu-
tion of the problem. If the dominant owner of a spur track easement
sends one box car a week over the spur track, sending another box
car a week to service an addition to his industrial plant obviously
places no unreasonably increased burden on the spur track. And if
the builder of a high-rise apartment puts a parking lot for his te-
nants on adjoining non-dominant land instead of going to the ex-
pense of excavating down several stories into dominant land for an
underground garage, there is no increase of burden whatever. But
some may not be content with a merely sensible solution.
To resolve such a problem then, one must look at how the court
can use its powers in various controversies. As we have seen, the
court, in an implied easement situation, takes a case where the par-
ties have given no thought whatever to easements and out of the
whole cloth manufactures an easement so that justice will be served.
If a court has the power to so create an easement, surely it has the
power to extend an existing easement so that it services additional
land. This power extends far beyond the law of easements. In a situ-
ation where a party, perhaps injured and unconscious, received first
aid, the court will create a contract and impose upon this person a
duty to pay for services rendered."' A formal contract may lack an
explicit promise, and yet the court will create and insert such a
promise into the contract because the contract is "instinct" with such
an obligation.44 Where a contract for sale of chattels is totally silent
on the subject, the court will read into it a warranty that the product
sold is fit for use and of merchantable quality.45 Under the law of
reformation, a court of equity will take Blackacre from A and bestow
it upon B." Where a contract for the sale of land is silent concerning
the quality of the title to be conveyed, the court reads into the con-
tract a requirement of "marketable title free from encumbrances."' 7
43. Cotnam v. Wisdom, 83 Ark. 601, 104 S.W. 164 (1907).
44. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917).
45. Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144 (1815), discussed by LORD DENNING, THE Disci-
PLINE OF THE LAW 34 (1979). As in the case of implied easements, the implication of a term
into a contract in the interest of justice is wholly independent of expressed intention and occurs
where the parties had no ideas on the subject. 3A CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 565 (1960). See also
Kratovil, The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the UCC: A Real Property Law Perspec-
tive, 16 J. MAR. L. REV. 287, 293 (1983).
46. Anchor in Marina, Inc. v. Grundy County Nat. Bank, 35 Ill. 3d 855, 342 N.E. 2d
422 (1975).
47. I. G. WARVELLE, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF VENDOR AND PUR-
CHASER OF REAL PROPERTY 303 (1890). See, in general, Kratovil, The Restatement (Second)
of Contracts and the UCC: A Real Property Law Perspective, 16 J. MAR. L. REV. 287, 299
[Vol. 24
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Courts, it is clear, create and modify legal documents as the occasion
requires. While this was true, especially in equity jurisprudence,
long before the Uniform Commercial Code was conceived, adoption
of the UCC and incorporation of the UCC unconscionability concept
into Restatement (Second) Contracts has given added impetus to the
process. 4'
Thus, one can conclude that use of an easement could be ex-
tended by the courts into non-dominant land owned by the dominant
owner so long as such extension creates no unreasonable or uncon-
scionable increase of burden. If such a rule were adopted it would
bring all the increase of burden problems under one umbrella. Con-
sistency may be the bane of petty minds, nevertheless it is a virtue.
Such a rule would obviously make for a more efficient utilization of
land, especially urban land. Additionally, it would put an end to the
extortion suits common in this situation and it would protect many a
lawyer from malpractice liability.4 '
While the drafting of easements presents problems more com-
plex than might be supposed,' overcoming the non-dominant land
rule presents little difficulty. One simply adds to the easement grant
language similar to the following: The easement appurtenant hereby
created is appurtenant to Blackacre above described and also to
any hereafter acquired land that may come into common ownership
with Blackacre.
It is, of course, possible and advisable to place some limitation
on the area of the additional property that will be so benefited. Some
drafters also add the phrase: "Contiguity is required as between all
parcels that are to enjoy the benefit of said easement." Others add
provisions limiting the type, size and use of buildings that may enjoy
(1983).
48. R. KRATOVIL and R. WERNER, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.2
(2d ed. 1981).
49. A lawyer will be found guilty of malpractice if his client suffers loss because the
lawyer was ignorant of some settled proposition of law known to other lawyers in the vicinity
engaged in a similar legal practice. MALLEN and LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 282 (2d ed.
1981); R. KRATOVIL and R. WERNER, REAL ESTATE LAW 44 (8th ed. 1983). In short, it will
not help a lawyer to plead ignorance of the rule. Yet it is obvious that in the many cases where
an easement was extinguished for misuse or where a dominant owner was ordered to split a
building, his attorney permitted him to embark upon the project because he was ignorant of
the rule. See, e.g., McCullough v. Broad Exchange Co., 101 App. Div. 566, 92 N.Y.S. 533
(1905). In the author's five decades in the field, he has encountered few lawyers who were
aware of the rule.
50. Kratovil, Easement Draftsmanship and Conveyancing, 38 CALIF. L. REV. 426
(1950).
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the benefit of the easement."1
IV. CONCLUSION
The inflexible rule that an appurtenant easement must not be
used to service non-dominant land was never anything more than a
mere ipse dixit. No reason has ever been advanced why this appurte-
nant easement rule should be accorded treatment different from the
other increase of burden rules. Courts have experienced little diffi-
culty in treating in a flexible and equitable manner the numerous
increase of burden situations that arise almost daily. The inflexibility
of the non-dominant land rule has obviously encouraged attempts at
extortion. Today rigid rules are suspect. In this instance, the time for
change has arrived. The rigid rule must go.
51. For a number of helpful suggestions, see R. KRATOVIL and R. WERNER, REAL
ESTATE LAW 32-33 (8th ed. 1983).
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